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Research Summary: ‘Value creation’ is central to strategy. Even so, confusion arises because it can 
be defined in different ways, e.g., as the sum of producer and consumer surplus in a given time 
period, or as the change in surplus over time. To formalize the latter notion we introduce the 
concept of economic gain, defined as the increase in total surplus. Economic gain can arise through 
innovation or when a superior firm displaces competitors. We provide a firm-level measurement 
framework to quantify economic gain and its distribution among stakeholders, including the firm’s 
shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers. As an empirical illustration, we compare the 
creation and distribution of economic gain by Southwest Airlines and American Airlines between 
1980 and 2010. 
Managerial Summary: Most managers and the business press regard ‘value creation’ as the increase 
in shareholder wealth represented by a rise in corporate profit or stock price. A broader conception 
of value creation goes beyond shareholders to include the value that is distributed to additional 
stakeholders of the firm, including employees, suppliers, and customers.  We develop a mathematical 
framework that allows this broader notion of value creation and distribution to be assessed and 
quantified in many cases.  We illustrate the framework using historical data on Southwest Airlines 
and American Airlines over three decades.  
 
Keywords: value creation, value distribution, value appropriation, stakeholders, economic gain 
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INTRODUCTION 
The notion that firms create and distribute economic value is central to the field of strategic 
management. Several streams of research—in particular, the resource-based view of the firm (RBV), 
the stakeholder theory of the firm, and more recently, value-based strategy (VBS)—explicitly focus 
on questions of value creation and capture.1 Despite this centrality of ‘value creation’ within the 
field, there has been a lack of clarity on the precise meaning of the concept. Without clear 
definitions and suitable empirical tools, researchers have rarely attempted to measure the total 
economic value created by a firm or its distribution among key stakeholders.  
A major source of confusion is that value creation can be reasonably defined in two different 
ways: first, as the total economic value created by a firm within a specific interval of time (sum of 
consumer and producer surplus); and second, as the change in this value over longer periods. We 
call the first definition ‘static value creation’, and the second, ‘dynamic value creation’ or ‘economic 
gain’. While both are useful concepts, the dynamic notion has been largely ignored in strategic 
management and is comparatively undeveloped. This is surprising given that the common view of 
value creation by a CEO is explicitly dynamic: shareholders want the CEO to increase the firm’s 
profit and stock price over time.  
Drawing together concepts from economics and strategic management, we show that 
economic gain has two components, which we call ‘innovation’ and ‘replication’. A firm may 
improve through cost reductions or through quality improvements that increase customers’ 
willingness to pay (WTP). We refer to these broadly as ‘innovation’, recognizing that they may arise 
																																								 																				
1In the RBV (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) the economic value created by a firm arises from 
the scarcity of valuable resources and competitors’ difficulty in imitating or substituting them. The 
stakeholder theory views the firm as ‘a constellation of cooperative and competitive interests 
possessing intrinsic value’ (Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 66) and focuses on value capture by 
these stakeholders. Similarly, VBS uses game theory to model coalitions of agents who cooperate to 
create value and then compete to capture it (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996; MacDonald and Ryall, 
2004; Makadok, 2011; Chatain and Zemsky, 2011). 	
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from various sources internal and external to the firm.  In addition, a firm that is superior to its 
rivals can create value by expanding at the expense of competitors, thereby serving more customers 
who may benefit from the firm’s higher quality or lower cost. We refer to this second type of value 
creation as ‘replication’.2 While the two components are related—replication creates value only if the 
firm has previously been innovative relative to rivals—it is useful to distinguish them in assessing the 
process of value creation. Given our focus on specific firms, we ignore value creation that may come 
from exogenous growth in industry demand. 
We adapt methods from the literature on productivity measurement to estimate these 
components of dynamic value creation, as well as the distribution of value among the firm’s 
stakeholders. In some contexts it is possible to derive the estimates from standard corporate 
accounting data. Although we cannot directly overcome the problem of measuring consumer 
surplus, which hinders most empirical efforts to estimate the total economic value created by a firm, 
we show that under some assumptions this problem can be reasonably addressed in a dynamic 
context. To make our concepts and measures more concrete, we provide an illustration of dynamic 
value creation for Southwest Airlines (SWA) and American Airlines (AA) over the interval from 
1980 to 2010. 
Our theoretical exposition of economic gain and the associated measurement framework 
make several contributions to the strategic management literature. (A related empirical study, 
Lieberman, Garcia-Castro and Balasubramanian (2016), analyzes a larger sample of airline and 
automotive companies, thereby providing more comprehensive evidence on inter-firm and inter-
stakeholder variation as well as guidance on data implementation.) At the broadest level we clarify 
that value creation by a firm can be viewed and potentially quantified in the alternative ways that we 
																																								 																				
2 Although quantity changes are not alien to VBS (e.g., Bennett, 2013; Stuart, 2007) they have not 
been extensively studied. Our discussion brings to the surface the fact that innovation gains and 
quantity changes are both fundamental in how firms create and capture value.  
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call ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’. The ‘static’ notion (total surplus) is widely recognized, but the dynamic 
notion (change in surplus) is often more relevant and measurable. 
The ability to estimate economic gain and its distribution among the firm’s stakeholders has 
the potential to facilitate conversations among theoretical strands of the strategic management 
literature—especially the RBV, the stakeholder view, and the VBS. Furthermore, economic gain 
links with the concept of competitive advantage, which is often defined as a firm’s ability to create 
greater economic value than competitors. Achieving economic gain is a necessary condition to 
increasing competitive advantage. Like economic gain, competitive advantage is now regarded as 
relating to all stakeholders (Peteraf and Barney, 2003; Coff, 1999, 2010), whereas most studies of 
firm performance have been limited to measuring shareholder value. Thus, compared with prior 
empirical work in strategic management, our measurement framework offers a more comprehensive 
assessment of a firm’s value creation and distribution. 
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTS AND MEASURES OF VALUE CREATION 
Confusion about value creation arises from at least two sources. As described above, one source of 
confusion relates to whether the concept is ‘static’ or ‘dynamic.’ A second source relates to the 
corporate stakeholders under consideration: only shareholders, or a more inclusive set. Table 1 
classifies common concepts and measures of corporate value creation along these dimensions. 
--Insert Table 1 about here-- 
Shareholder value versus total value creation 
The most commonly considered stakeholders are the firm’s shareholders. Shareholder value creation 
and associated measures (profits, market capitalization, etc.) are standard concepts. Using simple 
ratios such as return on assets or equity, the firm’s profit rate can easily be compared over time or 
relative to competitors. More sophisticated measures such as ‘economic value added’ subtract out 
the firm’s cost of capital in order to estimate true economic profit. Countless studies draw upon 
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such measures, which can be readily computed from available data.  
Such a focus on shareholder value has two main limitations. First, by considering only a 
single, albeit important, stakeholder, it offers a limited perspective, ignoring most of the economic 
value typically created and distributed by a firm. Second, it provides only a partial insight into how 
firms create value: managers can create value for shareholders by enlarging the total value created by 
the firm or simply by redistributing rents. Actions that expand the total pie are fundamentally 
different from those that merely carve a larger slice for shareholders, with distinct implications for 
stakeholders and society. 
Going beyond shareholders, the concept of total economic value is usually defined as the gap 
between the customer’s WTP and the supplier’s opportunity cost. This approach can be formulated 
within the context of supply and demand curves (e.g., Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer, 
2012) or in a bargaining framework (e.g., Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996). Although broader than 
shareholder value, this concept of economic value (total surplus) usually limits its attention to two 
stakeholders: shareholders and consumers.3  
Empirical applications of the concept of total value creation are constrained by difficulties in 
measuring WTP and opportunity costs. To overcome these challenges, a growing number of studies 
in industrial organization economics develop models of competition that incorporate structural 
estimates of costs and demand, thereby providing assessments of producer and consumer surplus. 
(See Ackerberg et al., 2007, for a review of this literature.) These studies typically examine a single 
industry, modeling specific features of the industry context to obtain moment conditions that allow 
supply and demand to be identified.4  
While the structural estimation approach has been used primarily to answer policy questions 
																																								 																				
3 Brandenburger and Stuart (1996) include three stakeholders: suppliers, the firm, and customers.  
4 A recent example in the strategy literature is Grennan (2014), which develops such a model to 
measure the importance of bargaining ability in determining the division of value between coronary 
stent producers and their customers (hospitals). 
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in economics, it offers promise for addressing questions in strategic management. A major strength 
of the structural approach is the ability to incorporate idiosyncratic firm or industry data to identify 
determinants of the economic surplus and its division among parties.  Although studies in this vein 
have focused almost exclusively on characterizing effects at the industry level, the approach can be 
applied to questions at the level of individual firms.  
Static versus dynamic value creation 
Within the two notions of value creation described above—shareholder value and total economic 
value—a second dimension relates to timeframe. Measures such as accounting profits, economic 
value added (EVA), residual income, and the economic value created (e.g., Brandenburger and 
Stuart, 1996; Davis and Kay, 1990) are static in that they focus on value created in a single time 
period. In contrast, the business press and much of the scholarly literature describe (shareholder) 
value creation as dynamic: an increase in the firm’s stock market value. The common notion of a 
value-creating CEO is not one who presides over a firm with large profits or stock market 
capitalization, but rather a CEO who is able to raise the firm’s profit and stock price over time. 
Shareholders want the CEO not simply to maintain the firm but to grow it in a profitable way; it is 
rare that a CEO is judged based on the level of shareholder wealth and not on the changes.5  
Furthermore, a dynamic framework emphasizes the need to consider stakeholders beyond 
shareholders in order to fully understand the flow of economic value. Firms that create new value 
may distribute it in different ways depending upon competition, legal rights, bargaining power, and 
so on. For example, a firm that introduces an innovation with strong patent protection is likely to be 
in a position to appropriate much of the innovation’s value for its shareholders or employees. By 
comparison, in an environment where technology is improving but difficult to protect from 
imitation, most if not all of the new economic value will flow downstream to consumers.  The 
																																								 																				
5 Moreover, arguments from behavioral economics suggest that human utility adjusts to a reference 
point and is thus more sensitive to changes than to absolute levels (Kahneman, 2011). 
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computer industry is perhaps the best example: prices of computers and profits of computer 
manufacturers have fallen over the past three decades even though innovations have exponentially 
improved the quality of computers used by customers.   
To summarize, the conceptualization of value creation differs greatly across the quadrants in 
Table 1. Concepts of shareholder value creation—both static and dynamic—are well established, and 
good empirical measures are in wide use. With regard to total value creation, static concepts are well 
developed, but the difficulty of measuring consumer surplus limits their empirical application. 
Dynamic concepts and measures of total value creation have gone almost completely unrecognized 
in strategic management, and tools for assessing value capture by multiple stakeholders remain 
rudimentary and ad hoc. This suggests the need for concepts and methods to characterize growth in 
total economic value and the distribution of that value among stakeholders of the firm. The 
remainder of this paper develops such a concept: ‘economic gain’.6   
ECONOMIC GAIN: A DYNAMIC NOTION OF TOTAL VALUE CREATION 
Concept 
We define economic gain as the change in economic value (total surplus) created by a firm from one 
period to the next. We begin by illustrating the notion of economic gain arising from an innovation. 
Consider Firm A facing a single competitor Firm B in some industry. Suppose in period 0, the two 
firms are identical, and the economic value created by each is ν0Y0, where ν is the average economic 
value created per unit (i.e., the average difference between WTP and cost), Y is the number of units 
of output, and the subscript refers to the period. Now, suppose Firm A develops a single innovation 
in period 1, and that innovation has two types of effects that last over two periods. First, the 
innovation increases the average value created in each period by Δν1 to ν1. Second, this innovation 
allows the firm to grow by taking away some of its competitors’ customers. In particular, suppose 
																																								 																				
6 We thank Arnold Harberger for suggesting this term. 
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Firm A grows to Y1=Y0+ΔY1 in period 1 and to Y2=Y1+ΔY2 in period 2.7  For simplicity, we make 
the following assumptions: (a) Firm A grows by taking customers away from Firm B8; (b) Firm A 
does not innovate in period 2; (c) Firm B does not innovate in periods 1 and 2.9 Then, the economic 
value created by Firm A in period 1 is given by: 
ν1Y1= (ν0 + Δν1)( Y0+ΔY1)     (1) 
However, some of this value is created by Firm A simply replacing Firm B. In particular, if Firm B 
had not contracted, then it would have created ν0ΔY1 of economic value that is now by created by 
Firm A (by assumption, the average value created by Firm B does not change and stays at ν0). 
Excluding this inter-firm transfer and subtracting the economic value created by Firm A in period 0 
from Equation (1) gives the economic gain for Firm A in period 1: 
Γ1 = Y0Δν1 +  Δν1ΔY1      (2) 
Turning to period 2, Firm A’s economic value created equals:  
ν1Y2= (ν0 + Δν1)( Y0+ΔY1+ΔY2)     (3) 
Note that we use ν1 as the average value created, since by assumption, Firm A does not innovate in 
period 2. As before, a part of this economic value created (ν0ΔY2) is purely an inter-firm transfer 
from Firm B to Firm A. Excluding this inter-firm transfer and subtracting the economic value 
created by Firm A in period 1 from Equation (3), gives the economic gain for Firm A in period 2: 
Γ2 =  (ν1 – ν0)ΔY2        (4) 
Thus, the total economic gain for Firm A from its innovation in period 1 is given by:10 
																																								 																				
7 If there were no costs to expanding the firm, the firm could expand and occupy the whole industry 
instantly. However, that is unlikely, and hence, a firm will spread out its growth over multiple 
periods. 
8 More broadly, firm A may grow at the expense of several firms, including firms outside the 
industry. This discussion can be generalized to those situations.  
9 In general, firm B may also innovate and increase its average value created over time. We discuss 
this later in the text as well as in Online Appendix B and C. 
10 We use (ν1 – ν0) in the last term of Equation (5) rather than Δν1 to make it more apparent that the 
comparison for replication gain is with an outside firm or industry average (see Equation (6)). 
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Γ =    Γ1 + Γ2 =  {Y0Δν1 +  Δν1ΔY1} +  (ν1 – ν0)ΔY2   (5) 
‘innovation gain in Period 1’ ‘replication gain in Period 2’ 
 
Hence, a firm can achieve economic gain in two broad ways. First, and corresponding to the 
first two terms of Equation (5), value is created through innovations within firms that increase the 
average economic value created per unit over its current output (Y0Δν1) and allow the firm to 
expand by immediately displacing some competitors (Δν1ΔY1). We term this as ‘innovation gain’. 
Broadly, innovations increase the customer’s WTP for the product (without proportionately 
increasing the opportunity costs), or decrease the opportunity costs (without proportionately 
decreasing the customer’s WTP).11 The second way of achieving economic gain, ‘replication gain’, 
corresponding to the third term of Equation (5), is when the superior firm, based on its past 
innovations, grows relative to its competitors.12  
--Insert Figure 1 about here-- 
We illustrate this graphically in Figure 1 for a cost-reducing innovation.13 In Period 0, Firm A 
is identical to its competitors, with a unit cost of C0 and an output, Y0. The price is p0=C0. All the 
economic value created, equal to the area between the demand and supply curves, is appropriated by 
the customers. The firm and its stakeholders receive their opportunity costs.  
In Period 1, Firm A innovates and reduces its unit costs to C1. Thus, the firm has created 
additional value (Δν1 = ν1 – ν0 = C0 - C1) by freeing up resources that can be used elsewhere. Now, 
																																								 																				
11 We include in the category of gains from innovation a range of enhancements that are under the 
firm’s control, such as unit cost reductions from economies of scale. Note that WTP and 
opportunity costs may also change due to factors outside the control of the firm. However, given 
our focus on economic value that arises through the actions of a firm, we exclude these possibilities 
from the concept of economic gain. 
12 The covariance term (Δν1ΔY1) could potentially be assigned to replication gain. However, this 
requires an unrealistic assumption of no firm growth in period 1 and is inconsistent with our 
measurement framework for innovation gain. (See below and proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in the 
Online Appendix.) 
13 Online Appendix A provides additional graphical illustrations including on the static notions of 
value creation. That appendix also lays out the assumptions underlying these graphical illustrations.  
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Firm A expands output to Y1 in this period by taking customers away from its competitors. Firm A’s 
economic gain in period 1 is the sum of the two hatched rectangles (corresponding to the two terms 
in Equation (2) or the two terms corresponding to ‘innovation gain in Equation (5)). The hatched 
rectangle to the left of Y0 corresponds to the gain from having a lower cost in existing 
markets/customers (Y0Δν1). The hatched rectangle between Y0 and Y1 is the gain from immediately 
displacing some of its less-efficient competitors, and expanding output (Δν1ΔY1).  
In the next period, Period 2, Firm A does not innovate further, but leverages its innovation 
from period 1 and expands output to Y2 by further displacing its competitors. Then, Firm A’s 
economic gain in Period 2 is solely due to replication of its competitive advantage in Period 1. This 
corresponds to Equation (4) (or the last term in Equation (5)), (ν1 – ν0)ΔY2, and is equal to the area 
of the dotted rectangle between Y1 and Y2 in Figure 1.
14 There are several real-life examples of such 
economic gain. Many successful firms such as McDonald’s, Starbucks, and Walmart started with an 
innovation that provided them an initial advantage over their competitors, and then expanded over 
time by leveraging that innovation. Later in this article, we discuss the example of Southwest 
Airlines, and show that it appears to have followed a similar path. Such replication is a common type 
of strategy, particularly when productive units are specific to a geographic area (Winter and 
Szulanski, 2001, Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003; Jonsson and Foss, 2011). 
While the above illustration focuses on a cost reduction, economic gain from innovations 
that increase WTP is conceptually similar. Firms that are able to increase their customers’ WTP, say 
by improving product quality, will increase the per-unit value created, and eventually grow by 
																																								 																				
14 Note that the same total economic gain would be achieved if Firm B had immediately copied and 
fully implemented Firm A’s innovation, thereby preventing Firm A’s displacement of Firm B.  In the 
next section, we will include such imitation as a form of innovation gain. The concept of replication 
gain is needed in our framework to capture economic gains associated with changes in market share. 
(If market shares remain stable in an industry with constant demand, all economic gain will be 
innovation gain.)   
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displacing their competitors. Thus, to summarize, economic gain arises when a firm reduces its cost 
or increases the customers’ WTP through innovation, or when a superior firm grows at the expense 
of its competitors. 
Now, we briefly discuss two sources of value creation ignored here. The preceding 
discussion assumes that the focal firm’s competitors do not innovate, and that industry output stays 
constant (at YIND(0,1,2)) in Figure 1. However, firms may imitate innovations from their competitors or 
adopt innovations from outside the industry. Then, the per-unit value created by competitors will 
also increase over time, and in the extreme case, competitors are eventually able to match the focal 
firm’s cost (or WTP). This causes industry output to increase (to YIND(N) in Figure 1). Further, this 
brings new ‘extra-marginal’ customers into the industry, as firms lower their prices (or improve their 
products). The economic value created for these additional customers is depicted in Figure 1 as the 
solid triangle towards the right of the figure. This is the familiar ‘Harberger triangle’ (Harberger, 
1954, 1964; Hines, 1998), which is often small compared to the gains from innovation. We briefly 
discuss this aspect later in the paper.  
We also ignore an additional way in which economic value may be created within an 
industry: exogenous growth in demand. Changes in consumer tastes, growth in population or 
income, or increases in the prices of substitute products may shift the industry demand curve in a 
manner that increases the consumer surplus generated by the industry. We exclude this type of value 
creation from the concept of economic gain, as it is independent of the actions of firms in the 
industry. Accordingly, our definition of economic gain through replication refers to expansion of a 
superior firm that increases its market share. Given this focus, we also exclude any value creation 
that may arise when a firm diversifies into a new industry. 
Turning to measurement, the notion of economic gain has a major advantage: at least a part of 
it can be reasonably and generally estimated using publicly available data on inputs, outputs, costs, 
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and prices (including potential adjustments for quality). Because it considers only period-to-period 
changes, under some assumptions, it circumvents the problem of estimating WTP and opportunity 
costs. This allows us to estimate innovation gains in many situations, and replication gains in some 
situations. Such a general approach to measuring a firm’s economic gain from innovation is 
discussed in the next section.  
Measuring dynamic value creation and appropriation  
Equation (5) above traces the economic gain from a particular innovation and represents the 
theoretical ideal where one firm is engaged in one innovation in one period. In practice though, 
many firms may have several innovations lasting over multiple periods. Hence, in general, it is not 
possible to measure the economic gain from a specific innovation. Instead, we focus on a 
decomposition of economic gain that is broadly analogous to Equation (5) but abstracts away from 
specific innovations. In particular, we use the following: 
Γt = {Yt-1Δνt +  ΔνtΔYt} +  ΔYt max{0, (νt-1 – νt-1*)}  (6) 
‘innovation gain’  ‘replication gain’ 
 
where Γt is economic gain in period t, Yt-1 is the quality-adjusted (discussed later) output of firm A in 
period t-1, Yt (= Yt-1 + ΔYt ) is the output of firm A in period t, νt-1 is the average economic value per 
unit of firm A in period t-1, νt (= νt-1 + Δνt ) is the average economic value per unit of firm A in 
period t, and νt-1* is the average economic value per unit of firm A’s competitor (or the industry 
average). The above decomposition is similar to Equation (5) and corresponds to the two broad 
ways of creating economic gain. A key difference is that we do not now ascribe causality to specific 
innovations. Further, it is limited to firm-level averages, and does not consider within-firm 
heterogeneity (such as across business units, products or services). The decomposition can be 
disaggregated to a finer level if such data are available.  
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As before, the first two terms in Equation (6) refer to gains from increases in the unit 
economic value created in a given period. However, in Equation (6), these gains may arise due to 
innovations in the same period or due to lagged effects of prior-period innovations. The last term is 
the gain in period t arising from firm A growing at the expense of a competitor who was at a 
competitive disadvantage in period t-1. Hence, it can be broadly considered as economic value 
created through the growth of the superior firm. We restrict replication gains to firms with νt-1 > νt-1* 
in order to avoid double counting of such gains and to be able to assign them to identifiable 
stakeholders of the superior firm.  
In developing the measurement framework, we assume that the WTP per unit of output and 
the input opportunity costs per unit (of input) are unobservable while the quantities and prices of 
inputs and outputs are observable. For interested readers, the Appendix explicitly states the 
underlying assumptions and a series of formal propositions that develop our approach in a more 
technical fashion. These propositions are proved and elaborated in the Online Appendix. Readers 
not interested in the derivation of the framework can go directly to Equation (13).  
Measuring innovation gain 
To develop our approach for measuring economic gain from innovation, we formally draw 
from the productivity literature in economics (Harberger, 1997; Harberger, 1998; Hulten, 2001). 
Consider a firm with three stakeholders (labor, capital and materials providers). Suppose, it has cost-
reducing innovations that reduce the quantity of inputs required to produce one unit of real output 
(broadly defined as output adjusted for quality changes; see Appendix for details). Specifically, the 
inputs of labor (L), capital (K) and materials (M), required to produce one unit of output, Y, change 
by ΔL, ΔK and ΔM. Then, the innovation gain in Equation (6) is given by  
Γ = -YΔc -ΔcΔY       (7) 
where c is the average opportunity cost per unit of output, which is given by c = (wL+rK+mM)/Y. 
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Here, w is the rate of labor compensation or wages, r is the rate of return on capital, and m is the 
price of purchased materials. Also, since the firm’s revenues, pY, must equal its factor payments, the 
following payment identity holds:  
pY ≡ wL + rK + mM      (8) 
where p is the real price of the firm’s product. We assume that on average, factors are paid their 
opportunity costs in the first period (and hence p=c, and (c+Δc) =[w(L+ΔL) + r(K+ΔK) + 
m(M+ΔM)]/(Y+ΔY)). Using this to expand and simplify Equation (7), we get: 
         Γ = - [w(L+ΔL) + r(K+ΔK) + m(M+ΔM)]    (9) 
Dividing by pY, substituting the shares of labor, capital, and material as sL=(wL/pY), sk=(rK/pY), 
and sM=(mM/pY), and using Equation (8), Equation (9) simplifies to: 
G = (ΔY/Y) – sL(ΔL/L) – sK(ΔK/K) – sM(ΔM/M)   (10) 
Equation (10) provides the economic gain from innovation. The Appendix (Proposition 1) 
lists the specific assumptions underlying the above calculations and shows that with additional 
assumptions (Proposition 2), Equation (10) also holds for WTP-increasing innovations. Broadly, G 
represents the increase (decrease) in output that is not attributable to increases (decreases) in the 
quantities of inputs used. For example, suppose Toyota produces a certain number of cars in a given 
period. In the next period, if Toyota produces 10% more cars with the same inputs or produces 
higher quality cars for which consumers are willing to pay 10% more, then (ΔY/Y) = 10%, and all 
other terms are 0. Then, the economic gain is G = 10% (of previous period’s revenues), which is 
available for distribution to Toyota’s stakeholders.  
Turning to the distribution of economic gain, revenues must equal factor payments in the 
second period as well. Hence,  
(p+Δp)(Y+ΔY)  = (w+Δw)(L+ΔL) + (r+Δr)(K+ΔK)  + (m+Δm)(M+ΔM)  (11) 
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Expanding, using Equation (8) and simplifying, we get: 
pΔY - wΔL - rΔK - mΔM = -Δp(Y+ΔY) + Δw(L+ΔL) + Δr(K+ΔK) + Δm(M+ΔM)  (12) 
Note that the right hand side of Equation (12) is simply the additional payments flowing to 
each stakeholder in the second period compared to the first period. To proceed, we make the 
assumption that the changes are small enough that the cross-product terms ΔpΔY, ΔwΔL, etc. can 
be ignored. (See Proposition 3 in the Appendix, which relaxes this assumption.) Dividing Equation 
(12) by pY and substituting for the factor shares, we get: 
(ΔY/Y) – sL(ΔL/L) – sK(ΔK/K) – sM(ΔM/M) = sL(Δw/w) + sk(Δr/r) + sm(Δm/m) – (Δp/p) (13) 
Note that the left hand side of Equation (13) is equal to the economic gain created (Equation 10). 
Consider the right hand side, which reflects the distribution of economic gain:  
G= sL(Δw/w) + sk(Δr/r) + sm(Δm/m) – (Δp/p)    (14) 
The first term represents the economic gain appropriated by labor (reflected as an increase in 
their wages), the second term represents the part of economic gain going to capital providers, the 
third term represents the economic gain captured by suppliers and the last term is the benefits to 
customers (in the form of lower prices). Consider our hypothetical example of Toyota, in which the 
firm is able to produce 10% more cars (or higher quality cars) with no change in input. In this case 
G = 10%. How might that gain be distributed? One possibility is that the gain flows entirely to 
customers as a 10% reduction in the price of Toyota cars. In other words, ΔP/P equals –0.10, which 
corresponds to a 10% price reduction for cars of unchanging quality, or equivalently, better cars, for 
which consumers would be uniformly willing to pay 10% more, at an unchanging nominal price. 
This pass-through of the economic gain to consumers might arise if all producers in the auto 
industry implement similar innovations and compete aggressively. Another possibility is that the 
economic gain flows partially to consumers and partially to other stakeholders.  For example, if 
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Toyota’s rivals do not achieve the same level of economic gain as Toyota—say, because they did not 
implement the innovations as successfully—it is likely that only some of Toyota’s gains from 
innovations will be competed away to consumers; the remainder may be captured by Toyota’s 
employees, suppliers, or shareholders. The extent to which these groups capture Toyota’s overall 
gain depends upon their bargaining power, the degree of competition in the industry, and Toyota’s 
performance relative to rivals.  
Note that the distribution of gains represented by Equation (14) applies even in the absence 
of any economic gain by the firm (i.e., when G is zero or even negative).  So, some stakeholders 
could gain (e.g., consumers) at the expense of other stakeholders (e.g., shareholders), even if the 
total economic gain is zero or negative.  
In the remainder of this paper, we refer to the formulation represented by Equation (13) [or 
its component parts, ‘value creation’ in Equation (10) and ‘value distribution’ in Equation (14)] as 
the ‘VCA model’ (for Value Creation and Appropriation). If the production technology is constant 
returns to scale, Equation (10) is equivalent to the well-known Solow (1957) decomposition for total 
factor productivity (TFP), whereas Equation (14) (the ‘dual’) has been much less frequently used.15 
Measuring replication gain  
The approach outlined above for measuring economic gain from innovation can be modified to 
measure the economic gain from replication. In this case, we first estimate the gain corresponding to 
νt-1 – νt-1* in Equation (6), i.e., the gain from shifting a single unit of output from the less efficient 
competitor (or industry average) to the focal firm. Then we can multiply this estimate by ΔYt, the 
number of units over which the focal firm displaces the competitor. 
Suppose the firm faces a competitor with the same WTP as the focal firm, and which pays 
																																								 																				
15 An exception is Harberger (1997, 1998) and related studies, which apply the TFP formula and the 
dual to assess economic growth at the industry level. 
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its input owners their opportunity costs. We can then replace the first (baseline) period in the above 
discussion with this competitor’s output and inputs scaled in a way that the scaled output matches 
the output of the focal firm. Formally, suppose in some period, Yc, Lc, Kc and Mc are the 
competitor’s output and input quantities, pc, wc, rc and mc  are the output and input prices, and ρ is a 
scaling factor such that Yc=ρY1, where Y1 is the output of the focal firm in the first period. Then, 
repeating the same calculations as above, we can write:  
 – {sLc(ΔLc/Lc) + sKc(ΔKc/Kc) + sMc(ΔMc/Mc)} =  
sLc(Δwc/wc) + skc(Δrc/rc) + sMc(Δmc/mc) – (Δpc/pc) (15)  
Where ΔLc=(ρL1- Lc), ΔKc=(ρK1- Kc), ΔMc=(ρM1- Mc), Δwc=(w1- wc), Δrc=(r1- rc), Δmc=(m1- mc), sLc 
= (wcLc/pcYc), sKc = (rcKc/pcYc), and sMc = (mcMc/pcYc). Note that ΔYc=(ρY1- Yc)=0, since we are 
scaling the competitor to the firm’s size. Broadly, the left hand side indicates how much more 
economic value the firm is creating, per unit of output, relative to the competitor in that period. To 
compute replication gains (in dollars) from this period to the next, we multiply throughout by (1/ρ
)pcYc times the extent of growth, (Y2- Y1)/Y1 (Proposition 4 in the Appendix shows this formally). 
The right hand side indicates the difference between the two firms in how that economic value is 
distributed. In particular, it denotes the additional economic gain (as a percentage of the scaled 
competitor’s revenues) to the stakeholders of the superior firm relative to what they would have 
received if they were part of the competitor firm in the first period.  
AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: SOUTHWEST AIRLINES, 1980-2010 
Overview  
To illustrate these concepts and methods, we focus on the U.S. airline industry to estimate the 
economic gain created by Southwest Airlines (SWA) and American Airlines (AA) over the interval 
from 1980 to 2010. We first compare SWA and AA using operational indicators to give an overview 
of how value is created in this industry. We then apply the VCA model to develop estimates of 
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economic gain. Our calculations are intended as a quantitative sketch of the creation and distribution 
of economic gain by these firms, not as a causal test of any hypotheses.   
The airline industry offers several attractive features for applying the VCA model. First, the 
requisite data are publicly available for many airline companies over a long period of time. Second, 
the industry is likely to meet many of the assumptions required for a reasonable application of the 
model. A vast majority of value creation in this industry is through cost-reducing innovations, 
particularly with regard to labor and fuel use. Innovation gains through increases in service quality 
(higher WTP for a better experience delivered) have been marginal, if any. SWA’s growth has largely 
come from a decline in its competitors’ market shares rather than through industry growth. While 
there have been improvements in the quality of planes, the quality of other inputs such as fuel and 
pilots have not changed significantly. Finally, the industry has been very competitive, which means 
the factors are likely to be earning returns close to their opportunity costs.   
--Insert Tables 2A and 2B about here-- 
Tables 2A and 2B summarize the data and our calculations for SWA and AMR over decade 
intervals between 1980 and 2010. The US airline industry was deregulated in 1978, when price and 
entry restrictions on interstate flights were eliminated. SWA began providing scheduled service in 
1971 but remained a small carrier flying only within Texas until late 1979. Thus, our data from 1980 
to 2010 capture SWA’s expansion across the United States. In its formative years SWA developed a 
distinctive business model (Gittell, 2005), which SWA refined and replicated during the subsequent 
period of expansion.  By comparison, AA has long been one of the world’s largest airlines; we take 
AA as representative of the established carriers in the United States. Moreover, AA and SWA have 
always been direct competitors, with SWA headquartered in Dallas, and AA in nearby Fort Worth. 
The most common measure of output in the airline industry is ‘revenue passenger miles’ 
(RPM), the total number of miles flown by paying passengers during a calendar year. We adopt RPM 
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as the standard to compare between the airlines and over time, recognizing that some quality 
differences exist.16  
SWA is an outlier in the airline industry, having grown to become one of the major carriers 
in the United States while remaining consistently profitable. Table 2 shows that in 1980, SWA 
produced 7% of AA’s output, based on total RPMs flown. By 2010, SWA had reached almost 60% 
of AA’s size and offered service between virtually all of the major cities of the United States. In 
1980, SWA’s net income was 13.4% of revenue; by 2010, this ratio had fallen to 3.8%, albeit on a 
much larger revenue base.  By comparison, AA suffered losses in both years.   
The major source of SWA’s advantage has been its labor efficiency.  In 1980, SWA had 909 
employees per million RPM flown; by 2010, SWA had cut this figure by more than half to 447.  In 
comparison, AA had 1,526 employees per million RPM in 1980 and 583 in 2010. SWA also enjoyed 
an input cost advantage in its early years, given that it paid comparatively low wages and salaries.  In 
1980, average wages and benefits were just over $26,000 per employee at SWA, as compared with 
almost $34,000 at AA.  By 2010, however, SWA was paying the highest compensation in the US 
airline industry, averaging $106,000 per employee at SWA versus $87,500 at AA. Thus, SWA’s 
advantage in labor efficiency was increasingly offset by a higher unit labor cost. In effect, employees 
at SWA were capturing a larger share of the value created by the company, as compared with 
employees at AA and other legacy carriers. 
SWA has enjoyed lesser efficiency advantages in other areas.  In 1980, SWA consumed 37 
																																								 																				
16 Airlines differ across various dimensions of quality. For example, AA offers a mix of coach, 
business and first class service, whereas SWA provides only coach class. Thus, AA has arguably 
provided RPMs of higher average quality. On the other hand, SWA’s flights have shorter average 
length-of-haul, which requires greater resources per RPM (given the time devoted to takeoff and 
landing). All airlines have adopted tighter packing of passenger seating in recent years, which has 
reduced the average quality of customer experience, offset to some degree by improvements in other 
areas such as aircraft entertainment systems. Viewed over a thirty-year perspective, however, such 
quality-of-service differences are relatively minor, particularly by comparison with many other 
industries. Thus, RPM provides a reasonably consistent benchmark for assessing value creation 
across airline companies and over time. 
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gallons of jet fuel per thousand RPM, as compared with 43 gallons at AA. Between 1980 and 2010, 
SWA nearly doubled its fuel efficiency while AA improved by an even larger margin; the two carriers 
achieved almost identical fuel efficiency in 2010. (These gains stemmed primarily from 
improvements made by the aircraft and engine manufacturers.) In most years, SWA appears less 
efficient than AA in capital input per RPM, although this could be an accounting issue.  In 1980 
SWA maintained a significantly higher load factor (RPM divided by Available Seat Miles, or ASM) 
than AA; in later years AA achieved marginally higher values than SWA. In general, load factors 
have been rising since the 1990s, as airlines have made greater efforts to avoid empty seats. Airlines 
have also adopted higher density seating—a fact well known to coach passengers. This tighter 
packing of passengers raises efficiency in the use of fuel, capital, materials and labor, although 
service quality suffers to a degree.  
Estimation of gains to innovation 
Table 2a summarizes our estimates of economic gains from innovation at SWA and AA.  Applying 
Equation (10) to the airline data (after extending the formula to incorporate multiple inputs 
including labor, capital, fuel and materials, as described in Authors (2016)), yields the estimated ‘total 
gain from innovation’ shown in the bottom portion of the table. In general, innovation gains have 
been substantial in the airline industry. Over 1980 to 2010, AA’s percentage gain of 66% exceeded 
that of SWA (50%).  For both carriers, about half of this total gain arose between 2000 and 2010, a 
period of industry restructuring when airlines responded to major pressures, including a deep 
recession and a steep rise in oil prices. 
Applying Equation (14) to the airline data gives the distribution of the innovation gains 
among each firm’s customers, employees, suppliers and shareholders.17  For both airlines, the 
																																								 																				
17 The analysis can be performed at a more detailed level, e.g., distinguishing management and 
employee groups within the airlines. Here we focus on average effects by stakeholder category at the 
expense of a more fine-grained discussion. 
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estimates show a consistent flow of gains to customers, as well as a sharp increase in the value 
flowing to fuel suppliers between 2000 and 2010. Employees also captured some of the innovation 
gains, although the pattern differs between SWA and AA. 
Over the 1980-2010 period, nearly all of AA’s innovation gains were distributed to its 
customers in the form of price reductions.  This extreme flow of value from AA to customers 
reflects the strong competitive pressure in the US airline industry. Only a small proportion (5%) of 
AA’s innovation gain went to the company’s employees. Virtually none of the gain went to 
shareholders, given that AA experienced losses of about 2% of revenues in both 1980 and 2010. 
SWA also distributed the majority of its innovation gains to customers. Relative to AA, 
however, SWA’s gains increasingly went to employees. Table 2a shows an employee gain of almost 
19% at SWA between 1980 and 2010, more than three times the comparable figure for AA. 
Conceivably, this shift of gains to employees at SWA may reflect an effort by the company to 
provide incentives and maintain morale needed to sustain rapid growth.  
Table 2a reveals shifts of value out of and then returning into the supply chain for fuel, as 
fuel prices fell between 1980 and 2000 but then increased more than threefold. Over the period 
from 2000 to 2010, the majority of all innovation gains made by SWA and AA flowed to fuel 
suppliers, most likely ending up as rents collected by oil producers. 
Perhaps surprisingly, Table 2a shows negative gains to capital for SWA. Although seemingly 
at odds with SWA’s consistent profitability and rising stock price, the negative values indicate a 
decline in the rate of profit, rather than total profit. SWA’s total profit has been increasing, as the 
company’s growth more than offset the declining profit rate. Over the 30-year period of our sample, 
SWA’s profit rate fell from 13.4% to 3.8% of revenue while the company’s total net income grew 
more than sixteen-fold. 
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Gains from replication  
The calculations summarized at the bottom of Table 2a estimate the gains from innovation within 
SWA and AA as they improved their operations from 1980 to 2010. Complementing this analysis, 
Table 2b gives similar calculations that compare between SWA and AA at four points in time: 1980, 
1990, 2000 and 2010. These calculations estimate the gains that would have been achieved by 
immediately transforming AA into a firm with SWA’s efficiency level. We perform these calculations 
by scaling up the data for SWA to match AA’s output (RPM) in each year, and applying Equation 
14. Below, we apply these estimates to assess the gains from SWA’s replication and growth. 
Table 2b reveals that SWA maintained a significant efficiency advantage over AA in each of 
the years examined. However, the magnitude of SWA’s advantage diminished over time. This is 
consistent with the higher rates of innovation gain for AA in Table 2a. Based on our calculations, 
shifting a unit of output from AA to SWA in 1980 would have produced an economic gain of 
27.9%.18 A similar transformation in 2010 yields a gain of only 6.0%.  Thus, the efficiency of the two 
airlines has been converging over time. One possible explanation is that AA was able to adopt 
innovations pioneered by SWA and others at a faster rate than SWA was able to achieve new 
innovations to improve its business model. 
The bottom portion of Table 2b allows us to draw some tentative inferences about the 
distribution of the replication gains made by SWA as it enlarged its market share at the expense of 
AA (and other legacy airlines). These calculations suggest that as output and corresponding resource 
inputs shifted from AA to SWA, much of the resulting economic gain was distributed to consumers 
and shareholders of SWA. This follows directly from the lower prices and higher profits of SWA 
relative to AA. However, one needs to be careful about such interpretations, as the calculations are 
based upon company averages; we do not know if such a reallocation of resources from AA to SWA 
																																								 																				
18 Equivalently, AA could have produced its 1980 output with 21.8% (.279/1.279) less resource 
inputs, based on the factor prices paid by AA in 1980. 
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at the margin would have had the same distribution of returns or have led to the efficiency gains that 
we see in Table 2b. 
Assessment of overall gains from innovation and replication 
To have a complete picture of value creation by SWA, we now bring together the forms of 
economic gain discussed in this paper. These are illustrated in Figure 2, which provides a stylized 
representation of the US airline industry supply curve as it has shifted over time.  To draw this 
curve, we assume that AA is representative of all airlines in the industry other than SWA, and that 
airlines have constant marginal cost up to capacity. These assumptions imply that the industry 
supply curve is made up of an initial flat portion over the output of SWA, followed by a similar 
portion at a higher level of resource input for AA and all other airlines. We also ignore any deviation 
between the prices of input factors and their opportunity costs, and changes in such over time. The 
resulting curve in Figure 2 resembles Figure 1 in the theoretical part of this article. 
--Insert Figure 2 about here-- 
We draw such curves for 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 relative to the benchmark of AA’s 1980 
cost level (set at 100). The values represented come from SWA’s output and the estimated total 
gains from innovation in Tables 2a and 2b. The initial flat portion of the curve is drawn at the level 
of SWA’s resource input per RPM, extending horizontally to SWA’s output in each year.  The 
subsequent portion of the curve is drawn at AA’s resource input per RPM in that year, relative to the 
comparable figure in 1980.  Hence, in 1980, the portion of the curve corresponding to SWA is 
21.8% lower (0.279/1.279, from Table 2b) than the AA part of the curve. These segments shift 
downward in each decade at the rates of gain from innovation estimated in Table 2a. The downward 
arrows on the left of Figure 2 correspond to the innovation gains of SWA, whereas the downward 
arrows on the right of the Figure correspond to the innovation gains of AA. For instance, from 1980 
to 1990, SWA’s innovation gain was 5.6% (Table 2a), which corresponds to the length of the top-
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most downward arrow on the left of Figure 2. The ‘toe’ of the curve expands in each decade, as 
SWA’s output has grown.   
From these curves in Figure 2 one can gauge magnitudes of ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ value 
creation. In each year, the shaded portion of the curve is the static value creation due to the presence 
of SWA in the airline market.  It represents SWA’s ‘added value’ to the market, as discussed in the 
VBS literature, or equivalently, the loss of value that would arise if SWA did not exist (and its service 
was replaced by other, less efficient carriers, as represented by AA). It is clear from the figure that 
SWA’s static value-added, given by the area of these rectangles, increased greatly from 1980 to 2000, 
as the decline in SWA’s relative efficiency was more than offset by SWA’s growth.19  
Figure 2 also illustrates the dynamic economic gains achieved by SWA and AA, which. were 
substantial for both companies. The total gain between 1980 and 2010 is the area between the 
corresponding supply curves.  It is the resource savings achieved through the improvements made 
by the two airlines and by the expansion of the more efficient company, SWA.   
Limiting the analysis to gains made by SWA, over each decade the total economic gain is 
given by the sum of SWA’s innovation gain (denoted by the appropriate downward arrow at the left 
of Figure 2 between the supply curves) and SWA’s replication gain (denoted by the horizontal 
arrow).20 It is clear that gains from replication have been a large component of SWA’s total 
economic gain, given the company’s large initial competitive advantage combined with its rapid 
growth.  Indeed, if SWA had made innovation gains at its historic rate without expanding from its 
1980 level of output, the company’s total economic gain would have been meager—merely the small 
rectangle between the y-axis and the downward arrows shown for SWA. 
																																								 																				
19 Under the assumptions, SWA’s static value creation (or value added) in each year equals SWA’s 
efficiency differential, as indicated in Table 2B, times the output of SWA in that year. 
20 If AA is also innovating, another reasonable estimate of SWA’s replication gain would net out the 
economic gain associated with AA’s innovation from SWA’s replication gain. However, then AA’s 
gains cannot be mapped to its stakeholders in that period (because the output and inputs associated 
with those gains is within SWA). The Online Appendix discusses this further. 
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DISCUSSION 
We now consider some implications of the VCA Model, and the advantages and limitations of the 
measurement framework. We conclude with a brief discussion of areas for future research.  
Implications of the VCA Model in Linking Value Creation and Distribution 
Lack of correspondence between creation and capture of economic gain. The VCA Model requires that the 
economic gain must be equal to the sum of the gains appropriated by the various stakeholders, but it 
does not impose any restrictions on how much each individual stakeholder can appropriate. This 
lack of a value creation–appropriation correspondence is similar to that in the VBS literature 
(Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996; MacDonald and Ryall, 2004) where value appropriation is 
indeterminate, subject to bounds. Furthermore, recent advances in strategic management, including 
works on the dynamics of rent appropriation and stakeholder bargaining power (Coff, 1999; 
Castanias and Helfat, 2001; Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a,b; Asher, Mahoney, and Mahoney, 2005; 
Wang and Barney, 2006; Coff, 2010; Harrison, Bosse, and Phillips, 2010), are consistent with this 
intuition. These properties allow a simultaneous examination of value creation and appropriation in 
empirical studies. Such an exercise is not possible with shareholder value, which, by definition, 
equals the value appropriated by the shareholders. 
Lack of correspondence between profit growth and economic gain. Profit growth is a key objective for managers 
and shareholders. However, profit growth does not correspond to economic gain if it comes at the 
expense of another stakeholder’s returns. As can be seen from Equation (14), such cases represent 
value transfers from one stakeholder to another rather than value creation. Conversely, while an 
increase in competitive advantage leads to economic gain, such a gain does not necessarily translate 
into profit growth. Competition for resources and customers may result in all economic gain created 
by the firm being competed away to customers and resource owners. Hence, profit growth does not 
imply positive economic gain, and conversely, positive economic gain does not imply profit growth.  
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Innovation gain and the average unit stakeholder returns. Innovation is often considered critical to a firm’s 
performance. Our framework highlights another important aspect of innovation: only innovation 
gain can increase the average unit stakeholder returns for all stakeholders of a given firm. To see this, 
set the left hand side of Equation (14) to zero. Then, if one stakeholder gains, at least one other 
stakeholder must lose.  
By comparison, pure replication is simply scaling up the current level of value creation by 
proportionately expanding the firm’s inputs and outputs. Hence, while the total level of value 
creation goes up, the value created per unit does not change, which in turn implies that the average 
return for all stakeholders cannot increase. This does not mean that the firm’s stakeholders do not 
gain. Because the firm is expanding, it will have more employees, customers and suppliers, who in 
aggregate now receive more economic value than they did previously (e.g., when they were 
associated with the firm’s competitors). Hence, some or all of these stakeholders clearly benefit from 
replication gain, even though the average return may not change.  
Advantages and Limitations of the VCA model 
A major advantage of the VCA model, besides its tight integration with theory, is that the data 
required for estimating Equation 13 (quantities and prices of inputs and outputs) are publicly 
available for many firms and industries. Furthermore, the model is based on a payment identity and 
thus does not require that markets be in some form of equilibrium. The method is therefore widely 
applicable.  
Even so, the full set of required prices and quantities are not obtainable for many firms and 
industries. Data on inputs from suppliers are normally lacking. In such cases, an abbreviated form of 
the model can be estimated based on value-added, as we discuss in Lieberman et al. (2016). A related 
constraint is that most US companies do not provide data on employee wages and benefits, and 
some companies are diversified to an extent that makes it hard to untangle value creation within 
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specific businesses without access to detailed business-unit data. Still, an exploratory analysis of the 
Compustat Global database (which covers 1996-2010 and about 115 countries) suggests that there 
are well over 87,000 firm-year observations with all the required data. The Online Appendix 
provides additional details, including data availability by country and by industry sector, and a flow 
chart that helps assess whether our model may be suitably applied.  
Another advantage of the model is its relation to traditional measures of firm performance, 
such as return on assets. Ignoring taxes, our measure of the gains to capital (sk Δr/r) represents the 
part of the economic gain that flows to shareholders. For instance, consider a firm with a capital (K) 
of 250 million dollars, and initial revenue (pY) of $200 million, of which $75 million went to workers 
as wages and benefits (wL), $25 million as profits to capital (rK), and $100 million as payments to 
suppliers. Then, its initial return on assets, r, would be 10%.  If this firm creates an economic gain of 
2%, then without any change in output prices, employment, wages, or capital stock, the measure, sk 
Δr/r, would be 2%, since capital owners capture all the economic gain. The new return on assets can 
be obtained by adding the incremental $4 million (2% of $200 million) to profits, and dividing by the 
capital base to get 11.6%.21 Hence, gains to capital in the model will be correlated with increased 
return on assets as measured traditionally. Nevertheless, as the SWA example demonstrates, one 
must be careful not to view a declining rate of return as necessarily indicative of a decline in the 
firm’s economic profits. For growing firms whose returns exceed the cost of capital, economic 
profits can increase despite a diminishing rate of return. 
While the VCA model has wide applicability, many limitations must be recognized. We now 
elaborate on these, referring the reader to Lieberman et al. (2016) for further details on some 
context-specific issues. 
																																								 																				
21 Part of this return represents depreciation; if the rate of economic depreciation is 10%, the return 
net of depreciation is initially zero, rising to 1.6% in the second period.   
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At the outset, note that we are using the terms ‘innovation’ and ‘replication’ to mean specific 
types of economic gain attributable to firm-level changes. We are agnostic, however, about the 
nature of underlying sources. Innovation gain could be due to the firm’s own innovation or to 
imitation of rivals or some other form of spillovers. Similarly, replication gain is the additional 
economic value created in a given period because the firm expanded by displacing a competitor who 
was less efficient in the prior period. In our framework, the economic gain created by a firm through 
imitation of a competitor’s innovation would be first reflected as an innovation gain for the imitating 
firm; subsequently, this firm might be able to grow and displace other competitors who failed to 
adopt the innovation, leading to what we call replication gain. Indeed, the biggest creator of value in 
an industry is often not the original innovator. If the objective is to separate economic gain into 
‘innovation’ and ‘replication’ as defined in this article, then our framework will provide the correct 
breakdown, within the bounds of its assumptions. This also means that our framework is not a 
causal framework.  
If market shares remain stable over time, all economic gains in an industry will take the form 
of innovation gain. However, as the example of SWA illustrates, in some cases a firm’s total 
economic gain may be achieved largely through displacement of competitors. In such instances it is 
important to account for replication gain, even though the estimate of this gain is sensitive to 
assumptions with respect to the identity of the competitor(s) being displaced. In our airline example 
we took AA as a representative competitor, but alternatively, we could have taken an average of 
multiple airlines or have based our calculations on the actual changes in airline market shares 
observed in each period. 
As shown in the Appendix and Online Appendix, the VCA framework exactly measures the 
innovation gains under certain assumptions. The Online Appendix provides propositions and a 
simulation analysis of the potential direction and magnitude of distortion if these assumptions are 
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not met. More importantly, it helps develop a broad idea of contexts where our framework is likely 
to be reasonably accurate. We summarize findings from those analyses here.  
In general, we find that the framework does well in measuring innovation gain if the firm 
grows by displacing competitors through cost-reducing innovations, and when input factors are not 
paid significantly more than their opportunity costs (Proposition 1 in the Appendix, Baseline 
Scenario and Scenario 2 in the Online Appendix). This is true even for large innovations that result 
in significant firm growth. Such conditions broadly match the assumptions of Solow’s (1957) classic 
article and the literature on TFP (Hulten, 2001). Thus, established industries where cost-reducing 
innovations are the predominant form of innovation are likely to be particularly good contexts for 
applying the model. Airlines are one such example.  
With WTP-increasing innovations, in theory, the model requires a constant-quality price 
index that reflects the underlying quality changes at the firm level. (See Proposition 2 in the 
Appendix.) While such firm-specific price indexes can be developed, a reasonable alternative is the 
use of industry-level constant-quality price indexes. Such indexes have been studied extensively (see 
for example, Diewert, 1995) and are readily available for many industries (see Online Appendix for a 
list). However, the use of such an industry-level price index requires the assumption that any 
observed price differences across firms in the same industry reflect quality differences (see 
Propositions 7—9 in the Online Appendix). This is more likely to be true for persistent long-term 
price differences than for short-term differences. It may be problematic for short-run analyses in 
very competitive industries with large inter-firm quality differences, where firms may pass through 
part or all of their quality advantage to consumers in the form of lower prices. Hence, a structural 
approach may be more appropriate to evaluate value creation and distribution in such contexts (e.g., 
Grennan, 2014). Similar measurement issues also arise if real input quantities are not directly 
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observed or if we cannot completely adjust for input quality changes (see Proposition 6 in the 
Online Appendix).   
Another source of measurement error is deviations of input prices from opportunity costs in 
the first period, which may arise if factor markets are not competitive. Though the framework allows 
for inter-supplier heterogeneity within a class of input providers, it assumes that on average, input 
providers are paid their opportunity costs in the first period. Sensitivity to this issue is discussed in 
the Online Appendix (Proposition 5 and Scenario 2 in the simulation analysis). In general, if a factor 
(such as labor) is paid more than its opportunity cost in the first period, the innovation gain arising 
from any savings of that factor per unit of output in the second period will be overestimated. 
Significant industry innovation may result in the addition of new customers to the industry. 
This may overestimate true innovation gain for a specific firm. Broadly, output sold to these new 
customers has a lower economic value per unit than output sold to the industry’s existing customers, 
which the VCA model is not able to discriminate.22  
 Another important limitation is that the method uses the marginal customer as a proxy for all 
customers. Thus, our approach ignores the fact that benefits to ‘infra-marginal customers’ (i.e., 
customers whose WTP is greater than the price) may differ from the marginal customer. This may 
be particularly problematic if a certain innovation increases the WTP for some customers but not 
for others. Further, any economic gain created through a unit-for-unit substitution of a costlier input 
(i.e., an input with higher opportunity costs) with a cheaper input (i.e., an input with lower 
opportunity costs) is not measured.  
It is important to note that the choice of endpoints in performing the calculation can be 
critical; selection of endpoints that are at different stages of a business cycle can introduce serious 
																																								 																				
22 However, as shown in the Online Appendix, the magnitude of such error is likely to be large only 
in industries where demand is highly elastic. In other industries with low to moderate price elasticity, 
the framework is likely to reasonably approximate actual innovation gains in industries.  
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distortion. Furthermore, Divisia indexes, such as Equation 13, are path dependent (Hulten, 1973). 
Hence an aggregation of sequential annual estimates will yield different values than when two distant 
endpoints are compared directly. Star and Hall (1976) suggest that such deviations tend to be small, 
but further work is needed to explore how these issues affect the robustness of estimates based on 
the VCA model.  
Finally, the model relies heavily on accounting-based measures. Previous research has 
identified inherent limitations of accounting data to measure anything of economic relevance 
(Benston, 1985; Fisher & McGowan, 1983). Accounting measures generally ignore the time value of 
money and can be distorted by depreciation schedules, variations in investments periods, or 
differential growth rates, which may cause the accounting rate of return to deviate from the 
economic rate of return (Fisher & McGowan, 1983).23  
Notwithstanding these limitations, Equation 13’s usefulness lies in its ability to provide 
quantitative insights into the distribution of value among the firm’s stakeholders. None of the 
current methodologies used in the strategic management field offer such a possibility, which has 
constrained quantitative investigations of questions related to value appropriation.  The limitations 
discussed above only serve as reminders to be careful when interpreting the results.  
Areas for future research 
The VCA model offers many potential future research avenues, particularly for empirical 
studies. We suggest a few examples. Note that the model is agnostic about the underlying source of 
economic gain, and hence, is not by itself a causal framework. Even so, estimates from the 
framework can be used to study causal hypotheses, under the same condition required for any 
																																								 																				
23 Although we cannot fully overcome these problems, our approach runs parallel to work in 
Productivity Accounting, a fruitful area of research which blends economics, statistics and business 
performance metrics (Davis, 1955; Grifell-Tatjé & Lovell, 2015). Recent studies in this research 
tradition have been able to obtain firm-level productivity estimates by using accounting data 
combined with supplementary information on input/output quantities and price indexes (e.g., Brea-
Solís, Casadesus-Masanell, & Grifell-Tatjé, 2015). 
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empirical study in strategy: there is some exogenous variation in the data that permits causal 
identification.24  
One issue that can be explored is whether shareholders are better positioned to capture gains 
from innovation or from replication. Replication gains do not usually require a firm to introduce 
changes in its business model. The firm simply grows by replacing less efficient competitors. Hence, 
there are no new knowledge asymmetries (in the sense of Coff, 2010) that stakeholders can exploit 
to capture more rents. Innovation gains typically require the efforts of skilled employees, who may 
capture a larger share of those gains. Hence, we conjecture that shareholders, as residual claimants, 
capture relatively more of replication gains (compared to innovation gains). This is consistent with 
the evidence for SWA (comparing Tables 2a and 2b).25  
Similarly, the model can be used to examine if a more ‘equitable’ distribution of economic gain 
helps or hinders overall firm growth and the sustainability of a firm’s competitive advantage. A 
number of literatures suggest that a broad sharing of economic gains is beneficial to the firm’s 
stakeholders (including shareholders) over the long term (Harrison, Bosse, and Phillips, 2010; 
Weitzman, 1984). Similarly, Coff (1999) suggested that if shareholders do not appropriate value (or 
their appropriation is not evident in accounting performance), it might limit imitation attempts since 
the firm might not appear to be unusually profitable. More generally, the division of the economic 
																																								 																				
24 We conjecture that assumptions regarding the time lag between the timing of an innovation and its 
impact on the average willingness to pay-cost gap and output growth (somewhat similar to 
assumptions in productivity estimation techniques such as Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer (2015) that 
assume a time lag between the firm’s productivity changes and the change in input quantities, which 
allows them to causally estimate productivity) may be helpful. We leave this topic for future 
research. 
25 A related question relates to how the rate of growth may affect the ability of employees to capture 
economic gains. Compared with other factors utilized by the firm, skilled labor may be the more 
difficult to increase rapidly and effectively.  If new workers cannot be hired and trained quickly, 
current employees may require incentives, e.g., to work overtime or to ensure their long-term 
retention within the firm. Moreover, employees may have power (through unions or other 
mechanisms) to impede the growth process. A firm that is growing rapidly may therefore choose to 
pay a premium to its workers. Conversely, a firm that is shrinking and laying off workers may have 
power to shift economic gains increasingly to shareholders. 
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pie can affect the future size of the pie. Potentially, these ideas can be empirically assessed in the 
VCA framework.   
CONCLUSION 
Understanding value creation and appropriation in firms has been one of the most fundamental 
concerns of the field of strategic management. Even so, the field has lacked clear definitions of value 
creation, and the extant approaches to measurement have important limitations. In this article we 
have attempted to provide greater clarity on the definitions by highlighting two main dimensions of 
misunderstanding—the breadth of stakeholder(s) being considered (shareholders vs. others) and the 
timeframe for analysis (static or within a single period, vs. dynamic across periods). We have focused 
on dynamic value creation and introduced the concept of economic gain: the increase in economic 
surplus generated by the firm between one time period and another. Furthermore, we have 
illustrated two main ways of creating economic gain—through innovations that reduce costs or 
increase WTP, and through the growth and replication of superior firms. Finally, we have presented 
a general, flexible, and computationally feasible method to estimate economic gain and its 
distribution among the firm’s stakeholders. We hope these efforts bring greater precision to the 
definition of value creation and provide a useful foundation for measurement in future research.   
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Table 1: Static and Dynamic Measures of Value Creation by a Firm 
 
 Shareholder Value Total Economic Value 
‘Static’ Measures 
(within a given 
time period) 
Current period shareholder 
returns 
• Profit 
• EVA 
• Return Ratios 
• Residual Income 
 
Current and (anticipated) future 
returns 
• Stock price 
• Market capitalization 
• Tobin’s q  
Current period returns to ‘all’ 
stakeholders 
• Total Surplus 
= Profit + Consumer Surplus 
= WTP – Opportunity Cost 
 
To individual stakeholders (other 
than shareholders) 
• Quantitative stakeholder 
interests (e.g., Luffman et al., 
1982) 
• Rents or quasi-rents to 
employees (e.g., Blair, 1998) 
• Division of rents through 
bargaining (e.g., Grennan, 
2014) 
 
‘Dynamic’ 
Measures 
(change between  
time periods) 
• Change in profit, EVA, 
etc. 
• Change in stock price 
• Change in market 
capitalization 
 
• ‘Economic Gain’ 
  
Note: This is not a comprehensive list of all notions of value creation used in the literature. 
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	Table	2A.	SWA	vs	AA	Comparison	by	Decade,	1980	to	2010.		(Innovation	gains	computed	within	each	company	over	time.)
SWA SWA SWA SWA AA AA AA AA
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010
1.00 1.47 1.79 2.21 1.00 1.47 1.79 2.21
Revenues	(=pY) 213 1,187 5,649 12,104 3,820 11,720 19,703 22,170
COGS 152 1,025 4,310 10,488 3,673 10,908 17,120 17,681
2,024,097 9,958,940 42,215,162 78,046,967 28,178,057 76,877,841 120,325,000 134,298,000
2,969,448 16,411,115 59,909,965 98,437,000 46,633,745 124,117,286 167,286,000 165,420,000
74 282 1,013 1,437 1,222 2,390 3,037 2,480
0.84 0.78 0.79 2.4 0.9 0.77 0.72 2.24
1,839 8,620 29,274 34,901 43,000 102,809 111,100 78,250
48 357 1,683 3,704 1,453 3,883 6,783 6,847
196 1,326 5,899 10,821 2,522 9,756 19,393 15,676
Taxes 1 28 392 286 -75 6 508 -35
42 448 1,826 3,336 1,120 5,184 8,151 8,008
105 119 134 155 136 152 164 165
28 47 603 459 -76 -40 813 -471
13.4% 4.0% 10.7% 3.8% -2.0% -0.3% 4.1% -2.1%
909 866 693 447 1526 1337 923 583
$26.10 $41.50 $57.50 $106.10 $33.80 $37.80 $61.10 $87.50
Fuel/RPM 36.6 28.3 24 18.4 43.4 31.1 25.2 18.5
97 133 140 139 90 127 161 117
68% 61% 70% 79% 60% 62% 72% 81%
1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 		1980-2010* 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2010 		1980-2010*
Total	Gain	from	Innovation	(TFP	growth)	(a) 5.8% 17.5% 26.5% 49.9% 13.2% 21.3% 31.0% 65.5%
Gains	to	employees	(b) 2.5% 4.0% 12.1% 18.6% -9.7% 9.6% 4.8% 4.7%
Gains	to	customers	(c) 26.1% 8.1% 6.6% 40.5% 26.8% 12.5% 20.5% 59.6%
Gains	to	fuel	suppliers	(d) -11.0% -3.0% 19.2% 5.2% -12.0% -3.5% 16.7% 1.1%
Gains	to	suppliers	(e) 7.9% -3.0% -3.2% 1.7% 6.2% -1.8% -8.5% -4.1%
Gains	to	capital	(Before-tax)	(f) -19.7% 11.4% -8.0% -16.3% 2.0% 4.6% -2.4% 4.2%
	Table	2B.	SWA	vs	AA	Comparison	by	Decade,	1980	to	2010.	(Gains	computed	between	companies;	SWA	scaled	to	AA's	output.)
AA SWA AA SWA AA SWA AA SWA
1980 1980 1990 1990 2000 2000 2010 2010
13.9 7.7 2.9 1.7
28,178,057 28,178,057 76,877,841 76,877,841 120,325,000 120,325,000 134,298,000 134,298,000
Revenues	(=pY) 3,820 2,965 11,720 9,161 19,703 16,101 22,170 20,828
COGS 3,673 2,116 10,908 7,916 17,120 12,285 17,681 18,047
46,633,745 41,338,570 124,117,286 126,685,279 167,286,000 170,760,130 165,420,000 169,383,805
1,222 1,030 2,390 2,179 3,037 2,888 2,480 2,472
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
43,000 25,601 102,809 66,542 111,100 83,439 78,250 60,055
2,522 2,729 9,756 10,236 19,393 16,814 15,676 18,620
1,453 668 3,883 2,759 6,783 4,797 6,847 6,374
Taxes -75 14 6 214 508 1,117 -35 492
Cost	purchased	materials	(no	fuel)	(=mM) 1,120 582 5,184 3,460 8,151 5,206 8,008 5,740
136 105 152 119 164 134 165 155
27.9% 14.6% 11.4% 6.0%
-9.8% 3.1% -2.1% 6.0%
25.3% 24.6% 20.2% 6.2%
-2.0% 0.2% 1.0% 1.7%
-15.6% -18.8% -19.4% -12.9%
30.0% 5.5% 11.7% 5.0%
(a) R=(∆Y/Y)-SL(∆L/L)-SK(∆K/K)-SF(∆F/F)-SM(∆M/M)	
(b) 	SL(∆w/w)	
(c) 	-(∆p/p)	
(d) 	SF(∆f/f)	
(e) 	SM(∆m/m)	
(f) 	SK(∆r/r)=R-SL(∆w/w)+(∆p/p)-SF(∆f/f)-SM(∆m/m)	
Gains	to	suppliers	(e)
Gains	to	capital	(Before-tax)	(f)
	*Gain	if	AA	were	replaced	by	SWA	in	each	year
*Sum	of	gains	over	decades,	1980	to	2010.
Price	of	output	(=p)
	Total	Gain*	(a)
Gains	to	employees	(b)
Gains	to	customers	(c)
Gains	to	fuel	suppliers	(d)
Materials	purchased	(ASM)	(=M)
Fuel	consumed	(=F)
Cost	per	gallon	Fuel	(=f)
Employment	(=L)
Capital	employed	(=K)
Wages	and	benefits	(=wL)
Load	factor	(RPM/ASM)
	Scale	factor	(SWA	expanded	to	AA's	RPM	in	each	year)
Total	output	(RPM)	(=Y)
Net	Income
	Performance	ratios
Income/Revenue
Employment/RPM
Wages/Employee
Capital/RPM
Price	of	output	($/RPM)	(=p)
	Price	indices
GDP	deflator	(US)
	Company	data	(nominal)
Total	output	(RPM)	(=Y)
Materials	purchased	(ASM)	(=M)
Fuel	consumed	(=F)
Cost	per	gallon	Fuel	(=f)
Employment	(=L)
Wages	and	benefits	(=wL)
Capital	employed	(=K)
Cost	of	purchased	materials	(no	fuel)
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Figure 1. Economic Gain for a Superior Firm
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APPENDIX 
Proposition 1: Consider a firm with cost-reducing innovations which do not affect the WTP. Under Assumptions 
M.1-M.4, the left hand side of Equation (13) is equal to the economic gain from innovation in Equation (6) 
measured as a percentage of initial revenues. 
Assumption M.1: The firm grows by displacing competitors whose average WTP and average opportunity costs per 
unit of output are the same as the firm’s in the first period.  Assumption M.2: On average, input providers are paid 
their opportunity cost in the first period.  Assumption M.3: The opportunity cost per unit of inputs is constant over the 
two periods. Assumption M.4: The quality of inputs is constant over the two periods. 
Proof Outline: Economic value created in the 1st period is ε1 = ν1.Y1 + ν1.(Y2-Y1) = (ω-o)Y1 + (ω-o) 
(Y2-Y1)  where ω is average WTP, and o is average opportunity costs. Substituting o = (oL.L1+ oK.K1+ 
oM.M1)/Y1 and simplifying, ε1 = (ω - (oL.L1+ oK.K1+ oM.M1)/Y1)Y2. By Assumption M.1, and writing 
ω=p + σ, ε1 = pY2- (wL1+ rK1+ mM1)(Y2/Y1) + σY2. Now, ε2 = ω.Y2- (oL.L2+ oK.K2+ oM.M2), 
which by Assumptions M.3 and M.1 reduces to ε2 = ω.Y2- (wL2+ rK2+ mM2). Noting WTP stays 
constant, and simplifying, the economic gain is wL1(ΔY/Y1- ΔL/L1) + rK1(ΔY/Y1- ΔK/K1) + 
mM1(ΔY/Y1- ΔM/M1) . Substituting (wL1+ rK1+ mM1) = pY1, dividing by pY1, and substituting 
sL=(wL1/pY1), sk=(rK1/pY1), and sM=(mM1/pY1), we get (ΔY/Y1) – sL(ΔL/L1) – sK(ΔK/K1) – 
sM(ΔM/M1).  
Proposition 2: Consider a firm with innovations which may affect both unit costs and WTP. Then under Axiom 1 
and Assumptions M.1-M.6, the left hand side of Equation (13) is exactly equal to the economic gain from innovation 
in Equation (6) measured as a percentage of the firm’s initial revenues. 
Axiom 1: WTP equals price for the marginal customer in the first period. Assumption M.5: There exists a constant-
quality price index φ with the following property: φ2/φ1 = ωm2/ωm1, where ωm1 and ωm2 are, respectively, the first-
period and second-period WTP for the first-period marginal customer. Assumption M.6: The WTP for every 
 
 
40	
inframarginal customer, ωi, follows ωi1= ωm1 + σ and ωi2= ωm2 + σ. 
Proof Outline: The proof largely follows Proposition 1. A key difference is the treatment of output 
changes. So, define ‘real output’, Yr, such that Y1
r=Y1; Y2
r=Y2(φ2/φ1) and the corresponding change 
in real output as ΔYr= Y2
r-Y1. The 2
nd period economic gain is: Γ= (ω2- ω1)Y2 - (o2-o1)Y2. Using 
Axiom 1, Assumptions M5-M6, and substituting Y2
r = Y2(φ2/φ1), we get (ω2- ω1)Y2 = p(Y2r –Y2). 
Substituting for o1 and o2, and simplifying, -(o2-o1)Y2 = pY1(ΔY/Y1) - wL1(ΔL/L1) - rK1(ΔK/K1) - 
mM1(ΔM/M1). Hence, true economic gain is pΔY
r - wL1(ΔL/L1) - rK1(ΔK/K1) - mM1(ΔM/M1). 
Dividing by pY1, and substituting for the input shares, we get (ΔY
r/Y1) – sL(ΔL/L1) – sK(ΔK/K1) – 
sM(ΔM/M1) .  
Proposition 3a: Consider the economic gain captured by the input providers. If Axiom 1 and Assumptions M.1-M.6 
hold, then the economic gain from innovation (measured as percentage of the initial period revenues) captured by 
customers, providers of labor, capital and materials are, respectively, – gY
r(Δpr/p), gLsL(Δw/w), gksk(Δr/r) and 
gmsm(Δm/m), where Δp
r is the change in real price and equals (p2
r-p1), Δw=w2-w1, Δr=r2-r1 and Δm=m2-m1, gY
r, gL, 
gK, and gM are the growth in real output, labor, capital and materials respectively. 
Proposition 3b: Consider the increase in unit returns to the input providers. If Axiom 1 and Assumptions M.1-M.7 
hold, then the increase in unit returns associated with the economic gain from innovation (measured as percentage of the 
initial period revenues) are given by the right hand side of Equation (13). Specifically, the increase in unit returns for 
customers, providers of labor, capital and materials are, respectively, – (Δpr/p), sL(Δw/w), sk(Δr/r) and sm(Δm/m). 
Assumption M.7: The changes Δpr, ΔY,… ΔM are small relative to their corresponding initial values so that the 
cross products ΔpΔY, ΔwΔL etc. can be ignored.  
Proof Outline: Second period real price is p2
r = p2(φ1/φ2). The change in consumer surplus is (ω2- 
p2)Y1 + (ω2- p2) (Y2-Y1) - (ω1- p1)Y1 - (ω1- p1) (Y2-Y1), which by Axiom 1, Assumptions M.5, and M.6 
simplifies to (ωm2- p2)Y2r(ωm2/p1). Dividing by p1Y1, noting that p2r = p2(φ1/φ2) and simplifying we 
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get– gY
r(Δpr/p1) whereΔp
r= (p2
r-p1) and gY
r=(Y2
r/Y1). For labor, note that the change in total wages 
are (w2- w1)L1 + (w2- w1)(L2-L1), which simplifies to gLsL(Δw/w1) where sL= w1L1/ p1Y1. To prove 
Proposition 3b, replace gY
r, gL, gK, and gM with 1 in the above expressions.  
Proposition 4: Suppose there exists a competitor that pays its input owners their opportunity costs and with the same 
WTP as the focal firm. Let Yc, Lc, Kc and Mc be the competitor’s quantities, pc, wc, rc and mc be the prices, and ρ a 
scaling factor such that Yc=ρY1, where Y is the output of the focal firm. Let GM= –sLc(ΔLc/Lc) + sKc(ΔKc/Kc) + 
sMc(ΔMc/Mc) where ΔZc=(ρZ1- Zc), Z={L, K, M}, and sLc = (wcLc/pcYc), sKc = (rcKc/pcYc), and sMc = 
(mcMc/pcYc). Then, (1/ρ)pcYcGM(Y2-Y1)/Y1 is equal to replication gain as defined in Equation (6).  
Proof Outline: GM multiplied by (1/ρ)pcYc  is (-wcL1 – rcK1 – mcM1) + (1/ρ)(wcLc + rcKc + mcMc), 
which simplifies to pcY1 – wcL1 – rcK1 – mcM1, the true economic value created by the focal firm in 
the first period. Dividing by Y1 gives the additional economic value created per unit in the first 
period by the firm, and multiplying by (Y2-Y1) gives the replication gain.  
